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Abstract:  The article explores two questions: what is feminist bioethics, and how differ-
ent it is from standard bioethics. Development of feminist bioethics, it is argued, began as a 
response to standard bioethics, challenging its background values, and philosophical per-
spectives. The most important contribution of feminist bioethics has been its re-examina-
tion of the basic conceptual underpinnings of mainstream bioethics, including the concepts 
of “universality”, “autonomy”, and “trust”. Particularly important for feminists has been the 
concept of autonomy. They challenge the old liberal notion of autonomy that treats indi-
viduals as separate social units and argue that autonomy is established through relations. 
Relational autonomy assumes that identities and values are developed through relation-
ships with others and that the choices one makes are shaped by specific social and historical 
contexts. Neither relational autonomy, nor feminist bioethics, however, represents a single, 
unified perspective. There are, actually, as many feminist bioethics as there are feminisms—
liberal, cultural, radical, postmodern etc. Their different ontological, epistemological and 
political underpinnings shape their respective approaches to bioethical issues at hand. Still 
what they all have in common is interest in social justice—feminists explore mainstream 
bioethics and reproductive technologies in order to establish whether they support or im-
pede gender and overall social justice and equality. Feminist bioethics thus brings a signifi-
cant improvement to standard bioethics.
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Marginalized for a long time, feminist bioethics today is recognized as an influen-
tial approach in bioethics even though its contributions are not always acknow­
ledged. This article outlines some major developments in feminist bioethics since 
its inception in the late 20th century.1
Already in the 1970s, and early 1980s when the field of bioethics began to grow rap-
idly, some feminist work was published commenting mainly on new reproductive 
technologies. By the late 1980s and early 1990s feminists developed a sustained 
critique of the health care system and of the field of bioethics. This work was 
widely circulated in feminist publications. Hypatia, one of the leading   journals in 
1   This paper was realized as a part of the projects “Bioethical Aspects: Morally Acceptable 
Within the Biotechnologically and Socially Possible (41004) and “Studying climate change 
and its influence on the environment: impacts, adaptation and mitigation” (43007) financed 
by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia within the framework of 
integrated and interdisciplinary research for the period 2011-2014.On FemInIST engagemenTS wITh BIOeThIcS RADA DREzGIć
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feminist philosophy, for example, published two special issues on bioethics (Fall 
and Summer of 1989), later revised and reprinted as a collection (Holmes and 
Purdy, 1992). In 1992 the International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bio-
ethics (FAB) was established at the congress of International Association for Bio-
ethics.2 As a result of all these activities, by the late 1990s, feminists had created a 
rich body of work covering a wide range of topics pertinent to bioethics. 
Feminist bioethics, as already mentioned, began as a critique of “standard” bio-
ethics’ focus on reproductive issues such as abortion and contraception, woman­
fetal relations and reproductive technologies. Initially, less attention was   given 
to interconnections between these issues and other bioethical concerns such as 
the limits of physician authority, conflicts between commercial interests and pa-
tient well being. Later on, however, these issues entered feminist bioethics as well. 
Feminists challenged the structures, background values, and philosophical per-
spectives in standard bioethics; and questioned why certain issues were priori-
tized over others. One of the central issues in feminist bioethics was the issue 
of social justice—feminists explored whether mainstream bioethics supports or 
impedes overall equality in the realms of health and health care (Donchin 2001, 
2008; Inhorn, 2007; Nyrövaara, 2011; Tong, 2001). 
It has been argued that the “dominant ways of doing bioethics are fundamen-
tally gendered contributing thus to culturally inscribed oppressive practices” (J. 
Leach et.al, , 2010). According to Leach et.al., within standard bioethics, gender 
oppression is reinforced in two ways. First, by focusing on questions that reflect 
masculine experiences and priorities—for example, health research until recently 
did not pay sufficient attention, if at all, to ways in which women and men suffer 
differently from the same diseases thus requiring different treatments;3 or to the 
fact that women throughout their lives suffer from more illnesses and disabili-
ties. Second, ontological and epistemological foundations of the standard bio-
ethics tend to privilege masculine ways of knowing while devaluing those ways of 
knowing that are culturally designated as feminine. Namely, the modern western 
science is mostly based in rationalism and positivism, in separation between the 
subject and object of knowledge, in duality between reason and emotion, des-
ignating gender characteristics to those notions while excluding emotions and 
intuitions from the process of discovery. “Western science and technology have 
evolved based upon the concept of predicting and controlling nature, and nature 
has been assigned the female gender by Western philosophers” (K. Zuga, 1999). 
Thus, both nature and women are designated as objects of knowledge. 
2   In 2008, FAB has established International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics.
3   Because women have been underrepresented in clinical trials of new drugs their safety 
and efficacy may be compromised when used by women.cOnTemPORaRY ISSUeS In BIOeThIcS: The naTIOnaL anD RegIOnaL cOnTeXT
21
Other feminist objections to standard bioethics include: its emphasis on deduc-
tion from abstract ethical principles rather than induction from concrete cases 
because such approach privileges the perspective of elite groups and legitimates 
the status quo within and between societies; a tendency to view ethical problems 
as problems between individuals, or as problems for the entire society, but rare-
ly at an intermediate level to take into account the moral significance of various 
groups; privileged status of expert opinions and disregard for input that could 
be given by social movements like, for example, feminism, environmentalism, 
and working­class organizations; finally, standard bioethics usually does not re-
flect upon whom the field serves and how (Donchin 2001, 2008; Inhorn, 2007; 
Nyrövaara, 2011; Tong, 2001).
Feminist bioethics, however, is not a unified perspective and it could be argued 
that there are at least as many feminist bioethics as there are feminisms: liberal, 
cultural, radical, postmodern, to name just a few best known streams. Still, even 
though there are diverse and sometimes conflicting versions of feminism, they all 
focus on equality or justice between men and women. Laura Purdy calls it “core 
feminism,” and argues that commitment to gender justice is the only necessary 
and sufficient condition for being a feminist. Different versions of feminism, no 
doubt, rely on different theories of justice or equality—but gender injustice and 
ways to achieve equality are central issues for all of them (Mahowald, 2001). Since 
gender justice is simply a subset of justice, Mahowald argues that as long as it is 
committed to justice, all bioethics is feminist (Mahowald, 2001), and that one 
day feminist should become a superfluous designation in front of bioethics. But 
that day has not come yet because sex, gender and other marginalized issues have 
not become the standard categories of analysis in bioethics. Feminists argue that, 
standard bioethics is actually unable to analyze structural injustices related to 
gender, class, race, sexuality, and other, because of its espousal of a liberal para-
digm, its individualism, and its decontextualized and ahistorical approach.
The most important contribution of feminist bioethics has been its re­examina-
tion of the basic conceptual underpinnings of mainstream bioethics, including 
the concepts of “universality”, “autonomy”, and “trust”. 
It is argued that the concept of autonomy in standard bioethics understood as 
“maximal choice” neglects the effects of power relations on individual choices, op-
portunities, and capacities, while the concept of universality obscures masculine 
and western biases behind a façade of neutral equality (Leach et.al, 2010). An ex-
ample of such conception of autonomy can be found in the UNESCO’s Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, adopted by the General Conference 
in 2005. According to Rawlinson and Donchin the Declaration “sets well­meaning 
universal standards that nonetheless obscure historical links between abstract 
rights  discourses  and  practical  inequalities”  (Rawlinson  and  Donchin,  2005). On FemInIST engagemenTS wITh BIOeThIcS RADA DREzGIć
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They find the Declaration’s two underlying assumptions problematic—universal-
ity and disregard of power relations. According to Rawlinson and Donchin, uni-
versal principles should rely on shared values as well as on differences in ethical 
values across cultures; and the Declaration should explicitly recognize disparities 
of power and wealth that deny equal dignity and rights to many. 
Feminists have also engaged in an examination of various specific issues and prac-
tical applications of feminist bioethics such as contraception, sterilization and 
abortion,  novel  reproduction  enhancing  technologies,  reprogenetic  and,  to  a 
somewhat lesser degree, non reproductive high­tech medicine, like organ trans-
plants, xeno­medicine, etc. Given that it was one of the first issues addressed 
and has remained one of the central topics in feminist bioethics, the next sec-
tion of this paper focuses on the concept of autonomy. It shows how this concept 
has been redefined and applied in examining implications of new reproductive 
technologies. 
Autonomy and Choice in Feminist Bioethics
The concept of autonomy defined by earlier liberal feminists as the “right to 
choose”—whether, when and how many children to have—in other words to 
have access to fertility limiting technologies, turned problematic when applied 
to fertility enhancing technologies and reprogenetics. In this context the “right 
to choose” has been transformed into “consumer rights” (Aengst, 2011, internet). 
Consequently, new technology has been praised not only for enabling infertile 
women to become mothers, but also for making it possible for all women to have 
as many children as they want, when they want, and of the kind they like. The 
consumer rights approach, however, neglects economic disparities among wom-
en, namely, the fact that these still rather expensive technologies are out of reach 
for many women. Thus, as is argued by radical and cultural feminists, the con-
sumer rights approach cannot be an adequate strategy for access to reproductive 
rights (Aengst, 2011, internet).
For them, this essentially neoliberal perspective suffers from several problematic 
underlining assumptions: the assumption of equal access to existing options; of 
unlimited autonomy and choice; and of unrestrained individual agency. Cultural 
and radical feminists argue convincingly that the autonomy thus envisaged is un-
attainable. They insist on the importance of context in determining the real ef-
fects and consequences of the new reproductive technologies. Context, here, re-
fers to taking personal characteristics into account, as well as the social, legal, and 
cultural circumstances of a given ethical issue.
In Serbia, for example, the legal framework together with the overall economic 
conditions in society determine that access to some of the most   sophisticated cOnTemPORaRY ISSUeS In BIOeThIcS: The naTIOnaL anD RegIOnaL cOnTeXT
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  reproduction enhancing technologies is limited to a small number of affluent 
women (i.e. couples) and potentially may result in a rather inefficient application 
of this type of technology. 
To begin with, The Law on Infertility Treatment by Biomedically Assisted Fertil-
ization passed in late 2009, grants access to invitro fertilization only to hetero-
sexual couples. According to this Law, state owned health insurance covers all 
the costs of the procedure but only for two cycles. Since, statistically, it takes be-
tween five and six cycles for conception to take place, it is fair to argue that such a 
policy is ineffective, inefficient and economically imprudent from a societal per-
spective—this costly procedure is, in other words, wasted in all cases in which 
conception does not occur within the two cycles. Not to mention emotional, psy-
chological, physical and many other costs that women and couples endure dur-
ing this arduous procedure, only to be left without the desired outcome halfway 
through. These couples (who probably constitute the majority) could, of course, 
continue the treatment in several private clinics. However, the rates charged by 
private clinics exceed economic capabilities of the majority in Serbia. The current 
rates range from 2500­4000 euros per cycle (depending on the procedure), and are 
affordable to only a tiny minority in a society where the average monthly income 
is between 300 and 400 euros. 
A further limiting element in the Law is the stipulation that single women can 
qualify for invitro fertilization “only in exceptional cases” that are not specified by 
the Law. The procedure is not available to women above the “age appropriate for 
reproduction”, again not specified by the Law; and to women who can conceive 
naturally, which potentially puts homosexual women in a disadvantaged position 
(see Law on Infertility Treatment by Biometrically Assisted Fertilization, art. 27). 
It is, thus, more than obvious that the “right to choose” invitro fertilization in Ser-
bia is determined (and significantly limited) by principles of heteronormativity 
and traditional marriage rules that inform the Legal framework which regulates 
access to this procedure. Poor economic conditions in the society at large and the 
lack of resources represent another limiting factor. Because health insurance cov-
ers the expenses for only two cycles of invitro fertilization, only a small number of 
the most affluent couples is in a position to undergo the procedure as many times 
as needed to conceive.4 
Contextuality  in  feminist  bioethics  has various applications—it refers also  to 
people’s embeddedness within social networks, and the fact that their decisions 
4   Belgrade residents are in a somewhat better position since the city government cov-
ers their expenses for a third cycle of IVF. Currently one hundred couples are enrolled in 
this program—twenty of whom have conceived thus far (see, www.beograd.rs/cms/view.
php?id=1529317). On FemInIST engagemenTS wITh BIOeThIcS RADA DREzGIć
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are made within the context of those relationships with others. This implies tak-
ing into account the obligations and responsibilities that one has within those 
interconnections. 
The idea of contextuality, connectedness and interdependence of people has giv-
en birth to feminist relational ethics. Particularly important for feminist relation-
al ethics is the concept of relational autonomy—that is autonomy through rela-
tionships rather than independence. Individuals, according to this view, cannot 
be treated as separate social units because their identities and values are built 
through relationships with others. 
[O]ur self is constituted to an important degree by relations with and re-
sponsibilities towards our intimates, and these relations and the welfare of 
our loved ones may be more significant than the interests of any individual 
self in isolation (Keller, 1997).
The concept of relational autonomy is embedded in feminist theory of care. Femi-
nists argue for a concept of autonomy that is sensitive to relations of care, interde-
pendence, and mutual support that, while centrally important for social life, has 
traditionally been designated primarily within a women’s domain. This does not 
mean that relational autonomy approach endorses the self­sacrifice and subordi-
nation of women. On the contrary, it considers the unequal burden that women 
carry due to their reproductive and care­taking roles. Thus, a relational autonomy 
approach includes a struggle for more equitable distribution of care­taking and 
views it as a precondition for achieving gender justice and equality. The theory of 
care insists that relation is ontologically basic and the caring relation morally ba-
sic. Caring as it is described in care ethics cannot be equated with caregiving; it is a 
moral way of life. We are individuals only within relations. We are recognizable in-
dividuals as separate physical entities, but the attributes that we exhibit as individ-
uals are products of the relations into which we are cast (Noddings, 2001, internet). 
The proponents of the relational autonomy approach also emphasize that in addi-
tion to their rational capacities, the characteristics of autonomous agents include 
their emotional, embodied, desiring, creative and feeling abilities, within com-
plex social and historical contexts (Campbell, 2002). 
Relational autonomy, however, far from being a “single unified conception”, re-
fers to various theoretical positions that put emphasis on social embeddedness of 
individuals, and on social structures and relations that make autonomy possible 
(Christman, 2004; Dickenson, 2001; Scherwin, 2008; Shirdlick, 2008). 
Feminist relational theory is particularly sensitive to ways in which options and 
opportunities are shaped  by power arrangements, and to the  fact that social 
  structures enable some choices while limiting others. They distinguish between cOnTemPORaRY ISSUeS In BIOeThIcS: The naTIOnaL anD RegIOnaL cOnTeXT
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autonomy­enhancing and autonomy­undermining influences within particular 
historical and social contexts. 
For example, feminists point to the numerous ways in which reproduction en-
hancing technologies and reprogenetics may actually be oppressive and limit re-
productive choices for some women (Dickenson 2001; Parks 2009).
In some societies the new reproductive technologies may increase pressure on 
women to opt for motherhood, especially where men are expected to be bread-
winners (Gupta, Richters, 2008). The availability of assisted reproductive tech-
nology can weaken the women’s struggle against potential negative consequences 
of infertility. Research and state funds could be disproportionally directed to the 
development of reproduction enhancing technologies, neglecting the research 
that could lead to the elimination of certain types of the most widespread causes 
of infertility. As a consequence, limited resources that should be dedicated to the 
health care of all women are disproportionally directed to assisted reproduction 
of some women (Rajani, 1999). 
New technologies could also revive the idea of the universal maternal “instinct”, 
while  the  possibilities  offered  by  repro­genetics  and  prenatal  diagnosis  have 
turned choice “into a eugenic obligation which women cannot forego without be-
ing termed irresponsible towards themselves and towards society” (Dickenson, 
2009, internet) if they do not bring a “perfect baby” into the world.
According to Sarah Franklin, assisted reproduction technology, has brought about 
a change in the perception of nature—women and their reproductive functions 
are now treated as inferior to technology and also submitted to it:
ART “de­naturalizes” reproduction and “naturalizes” ART simultaneously. 
It reduces infertility and natural conception to the same level of insuffi-
ciency. Infertile women’s nature is insufficient because of their limitation 
to conceive; natural conception is insufficient because it cannot guarantee 
the aspired outcome, which is the birth of a (fit) child. In both cases, na-
ture needs “the helping hand” of medical and technical assistance to over-
come its deficiency. This does not only legitimize ART, but it “naturalizes” 
it (Franklin 1995a:334). 
The application of the feminist concept of relational autonomy to specific situ-
ations has shown some weaknesses, summarized by Christman in three points: 
the abstract and fluid quality that limits its applicability to concrete situations; 
overemphasis put on interrelationships at the expense of the private self and self­
determination; and the relational autonomy approach could override individual 
rights and interests in the name of family, group, or community rights (Christ-
manm, 2004).On FemInIST engagemenTS wITh BIOeThIcS RADA DREzGIć
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Christman, however, does not reject the relational approach. He only insists that 
it be applied cautiously, with these limitations in mind. He actually identifies six 
important themes in relational autonomy: since relational life is inevitable, our 
decisions are to some extent constrained by the responsibilities and relationships 
within which we are embedded; trust, responsibility and care are as important as 
autonomy; emotions, attitudes, desires, creativity, feelings, memory are all im-
portant parts of autonomy alongside rationality; social structures fundamentally 
shape our identities, desires, beliefs and emotional attitudes—hence, the skills 
needed to exercise autonomy are learned and developed “in and through relation-
ships”; finally, while “relational life is ‘good’, and beneficial relationships are vital 
for genuine autonomy to flourish, relationships and social structures can also be 
oppressive or abusive. A core part of relational autonomy therefore emphasizes 
protecting people from harmful relationships and their consequences” (Christ-
man, 2004:157).
Some feminists, however, believe that the concept of relational autonomy does 
not go far enough in challenging and deconstructing the liberal concept of the 
free, independent self. 
The concept of autonomy, which is central to liberal humanism in its mas-
culinist formulations, gets kicked around a bit, only to reappear in revised 
forms that extend agency to previously oppressed groups—women, pa-
tients and global others. The feminist turn to relationality… [however] fails 
to radically disengage from the image of the bounded liberal humanist sub-
ject, who acts, consents, and makes moral choices as an individual” (Shil-
drick, 2008:31­32; see also Campbell, 2002).
Shildrick suggests that the notion of interconnectedness should be expanded to 
include intercorporeality and concorporeality (particularly significant in the do-
main of organ transplants). It should also recognize that “the boundaries of the 
human body are part of a cultural, and indeed, biomedical imaginary, not a repre-
sentation of how things really are” (Shildrick, 2008:34).
Similarly, Meyers, warns that an emphasis on integration that is inherent to the 
notion of autonomy may run counter to some of the most important insights of 
feminism and postmodernism regarding non­integrated, conflictual, and plural-
istic selves. 
Feminist vs. Standard Bioethics
Feminists have participated in scholarly discussion of virtually all the major topics 
in bioethics (sex selection techniques, genetic ties to children, disabilities, genetic 
testing and screening, abortion, discrimination in health insurance and employ-
ment, stem cell research, human cloning, etc.), and their writings now appear reg-cOnTemPORaRY ISSUeS In BIOeThIcS: The naTIOnaL anD RegIOnaL cOnTeXT
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ularly in bioethics journals and anthologies. Despite this, the specific health care 
concerns of women and other marginalized groups still receive disproportionally 
little attention in mainstream bioethics. 
Within feminist bioethics, on the other hand, reproduction remains the central 
topic, due to, among other reasons, the fast development of new reproductive 
technologies, with ever more complex social and ethical implications and with 
unequal burdens they put on women and men. For example—there is pressure 
put on women to produce only “perfect” children using prenatal techniques. This 
is accompanied by the increased stigma imposed on those children who happen 
to be born with disabilities. Feminist authors worn that development of genet-
ic enhancement techniques could expand these tendencies and thus pose even 
greater threats to social equality. The main feminist objection to standard bioeth-
ics is its neglect of issues of power and social justice. In order to amend this, fem-
inists focus on power and justice in their approach to reproductive technologies 
and reprogenetics. Their most important conclusion is that these technologies 
(for example superovulation, egg extraction and prenatal and preimplantation di-
agnosis) are not gender­neutral because they put greater physical, psychological 
emotional and even moral burden on women, since it is women who are expected 
to assume responsibility not only for their own health but also for the health of 
their families. Reprogenetics and new reproductive technologies thus pose prob-
lems when they ignore or, worse still, exacerbate the difference in burden between 
men and women (Dickenson, 2009, internet). 
According to Dickenson, feminism makes three separate, but equally important 
contributions to the field of human genetics and the new reproductive technolo-
gies. First, feminism explores ways in which these new technologies have the po-
tential to exploit women while seeming to offer them greater reproductive free-
dom. Second, feminism stresses the fact that genetic testing and reproductive 
choice takes place in the context of relationships, and investigates ways in which 
this happens. Finally, feminists were the first to point out the commodification 
and commercialization in genetic research and application, issues which often 
  affect women disproportionately. (Dickenson, 2009, internet).
Anne Donchin (2008) identifies three goals that have been central in feminist bio-
ethics: extension of bioethics theory to integrate concerns of race, class, ethnic-
ity and gender; reexamination of the principles of bioethics; and creation of new 
strategies and methodologies that include the standpoints of those who are so-
cially marginalized. In pursuing these goals, feminist bioethics has made a signifi-
cant theoretical and methodological contribution in understanding the meaning 
and applications of new reproductive technologies and repro­genetics. More-
over, feminist bioethics has suggested possible ways to minimize the threat of in-
tensified inequalities—for example including representatives of affected groups On FemInIST engagemenTS wITh BIOeThIcS RADA DREzGIć
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within policy­making bodies ( e.g. women, people living with disabilities). Thus 
it could be argued that feminist bioethics gives an important contribution and a 
necessary correction to standard bioethics. 
What, according to Rosemary Tong, all feminist approaches to bioethics have in 
common, despite the differences in politics, ontology, epistemology, and ethics, 
is posing questions, raising consciousness, and action­oriented methodology. Ac-
cording to her, they all ask the so­called woman or gender question, pointing to 
the subordinate status of women in society, and they work towards eliminating 
gaps between feminist theory and feminist practice. She is hopeful that one day 
these approaches might also share a “philosophical framework flexible enough to 
accommodate a very wide range of feminist politics, ontologies, epistemologies 
and ethics—that would constitute the foundation of an eclectic, positional and 
relational feminist bioethics” (Tong, 1997:93). She envisions eclectic politics as a 
combination of socialist, Marxist and radical approaches to inequality—for exam-
ple, a combination of an emphasis on equality with a feminine approach to health 
care. Positional epistemology, according to her, assumes that there is truth to be 
known, but knowledge of it is always positional and partial—it emerges from roles 
and relationships and no one (individual or group) possesses it entirely. Finally, 
relational ontology, deconstructs the concept of self as discrete and self­sufficient 
(Tong, 1997:96).
A similar position is put forward by Susan Sherwin (2008). Instead of aiming for 
a single grand theory, moral theories, she argues, should be preconceived as mul-
tiple perspectives that provide partial and overlapping resources to address dif-
ficult moral issues. Within such a preconception, various, at present competing 
approaches, would, as she puts it, offer overlapping and interlocking “lenses” to il-
luminate dimensions of moral problems obscured when approached from a single 
overarching theoretical matrix.
Such a framework, she continues, would be best suited to reveal structural injus-
tices that are masked by currently prevailing approaches; it would enable reshap-
ing social conditions in a way that promotes the autonomy, health, and well­being 
of subordinated groups across diverse cultures and traditions. In this way, femi-
nist bioethics would come close to achieving one of its most important goals—
equality and social justice for all.
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Rada Drezgić
O susretu feminizma i bioetike
apstrakt
Tekst pokušava da pruži odgovor na dva pitanja: šta je feministička bioetika i po čemu 
se ona razlikuje od standardne“ bioetike. Počeci feminističke bioetike vezuju se za prve 
feminističke kritike „standardne“ bioetike, a njen dalji razvoj i najznačajniji doprinos po-
vezani su s redefinisanjem centralnih kategorija glavnog toka bioetke. To su, pre sve-
ga, „opštost“, „autonomija“ i „poverenje“. Za feminizam je od posebnog značaja koncept 
autonomije, te se njemu u tekstu poklanja nešto više pažnje. Feminzam kritikuje stari 
liberalni pristup autonomiji u kome se pojedinci posmatraju kao zasebne, izolovane je-
dinke, smatrajući da se autonomija ostvaruje kroz društvene odnose. Koncpet relacio-
ne autonomije polazi od pretpostavke da se identiteti razvijaju i vrednosti usvajaju kroz 
odnose s drugima, kao i da su izbori koje pojedinici prave u velikoj meri određeni kon-
kretnim društvenim kontekstom. ni relaciona autonomija kao ni feministička bioetika, 
međutim, ne predstavljaju jedinstveno, unisono, stanovište. može se reći da ima onoliko 
feminističkih bioetika koliko i feminizama—liberalni, radikalni, kulturni, postmoderni... 
Oni se između sebe razlikuju po ontološkim, epistemološkim i političkim premisama 
koje nadalje određuju i njihov pristup bioetičkim pitanjima. Ipak, svi ovi različiti femi-
nizmi i feminističke bioetike bave se pitanjem socijalne pravde. U okviru feminizma bio-
etika i reproduktivne tehnologije i reprogenetika se proučavaju da bi se utvrdilo da li i 
u kojoj meri podupiru ili pak ograničavaju rodnu ravnopravnost i opštu pravdu u druš-
tvu. Stoga se može reći da feministička bioetika donosi značajno poboljšanje i dopunu 
„standardnoj“ bioetici. 
Ključne reči  feminizam, bioetika, socijalna pravda, autonomija, reproduktivne 
tehnologije.